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Abstract
Quantum key distribution (QKD) promises secure key agreement by using quantum mechanical
systems. We argue that QKD will be an important part of future cryptographic infrastructures. It
can provide long-term confidentiality for encrypted information without reliance on computational
assumptions. Although QKD still requires authentication to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks, it can
make use of either information-theoretically secure symmetric key authentication or computationally
secure public key authentication: even when using public key authentication, we argue that QKD
still offers stronger security than classical key agreement.
1 Introduction
Since its discovery, the field of quantum cryptography — and in particular, quantum key distribution
(QKD) — has garnered widespread technical and popular interest. The promise of “unconditional
security” has brought public interest, but the often unbridled optimism expressed for this field has also
spawned criticism and analysis [Sch03, PPS04, Sch07, Sch08].
QKD is a new tool in the cryptographer’s toolbox: it allows for secure key agreement over an
untrusted channel where the output key is entirely independent from any input value, a task that is
impossible using classical1 cryptography. QKD does not eliminate the need for other cryptographic
primitives, such as authentication, but it can be used to build systems with new security properties. As
experimental research continues, we expect the costs and challenges of using QKD to decrease to the
point where QKD systems can be deployed affordably and their behaviour can be certified.
Through the rest of this paper, we restrict our discussion on quantum cryptography to quantum key
distribution (QKD). Many other quantum cryptographic primitives exist — quantum private channels,
quantum public key encryption, quantum coin tossing, blind quantum computation, quantum money
— but almost all require a medium- to large- scale quantum computer for implementation. QKD,
1All computation must be viewed as taking place in a physical system described by particular laws of nature. By classical
cryptography, we mean cryptography taking place in a computational and communication system modelled with classical
physics (i.e., non-quantum-mechanical and non-relativistic physics); that is, using processes described by probabilistic Turing
machines.
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on the other hand, has already been implemented by many different groups, has seen attempts at
commercialization, and thus its potential role in upcoming security infrastructures merits serious
examination.
There are three phases (which are sometimes intertwined) to establishing secure communications:
1. Key agreement: Two parties agree upon a secure, shared private key.
2. Authentication: Allows a party to be certain that a message comes from a particular party. In order
for key agreement to avoid man-in-the-middle attacks, authentication of some form must be used.
3. Key usage: Once a secure key is established, it can be used for encryption (using a one-time pad or
some other cipher), further authentication, or other cryptographic purposes.
QKD is just one part of this overall information security infrastructure: two parties can agree upon
a private key, the security of which depends on no computational assumptions, and which is entirely
independent of any input to the protocol.
If we live in a world where we can reasonably expect public key cryptography to be secure in the
short- to medium-term, then the combination of public key cryptography for authentication and QKD for
key agreement can lead to very strong long-term security with all the convenience and benefits we have
come to expect from distributed authentication in a public key infrastructure.
If we live in a world where public key cryptography can no longer be employed safely, we must
revert to doing classical key establishment over a private channel, such as a trusted courier, or use QKD.
QKD would still require a private channel to establish authentication keys. Instead of just establishing
short authentication keys, a private channel could in principle be used to exchange an amount of key
comparable to what QKD could produce over a long period of time. However, in this setting QKD can
have an advantage because the amount of private communication required is much less and because
the session keys output by QKD are independent from the keys transmitted across the private channel,
leaving a short time window in which compromised keying material can affect the security of future
sessions. How much of an advantage this is in practice will depend on the nature of the private channel
in question and the trust assumptions.
If we live in a world where there exist public key agreement schemes that are believed to be secure
indefinitely, then there is a reduced case for QKD, but it is still of interest for a variety of reasons.
QKD creates random, independent session keys, which can reduce the damage caused by ephemeral
key leakage. Other forms of quantum cryptography may also be of interest, especially for the secure
communication of quantum information if quantum computing becomes widespread.
Experimental research on quantum key distribution continues to improve the usability, rate, and
distance of QKD systems, and the ability to provide and certify their physical security. As public key
cryptography systems are retooled with new algorithms and standards over the coming years, there is an
opportunity to incorporate QKD as a new tool offering fundamentally new security features.
Related work. This work is motivated as a response to other opinions about the role of QKD, especially
the thoughtful note “Why quantum cryptography?” by Paterson, Piper, and Schack [PPS04]. Our
discussion on encryption and authentication addresses many of the same points as [PPS04] with
an optimistic view of the prospect of post-quantum public key cryptography; we provide additional
information on the assumptions for the security of QKD, the current state of QKD implementations, and
how the structure of QKD networks will evolve as technology progresses. A response by the SECOQC
project [ABB+07] addresses related concerns as well, with special attention paid to the networks of QKD
links.
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Figure 1: Flow chart of the stages of a quantum key distribution protocol. Stages with double lines
require classical authentication.
Outline. In the rest of this paper, we argue that QKD has a valuable role to play in future security
infrastructures. In Section 2, we give an overview of how QKD works, and give an example where its
high security is needed in Section 3. We describe the conditions for the security of QKD in Section 4.
We then discuss the other parts of the communication infrastructure: encryption in Section 5 and
authentication in Section 6. In Section 7, we discuss some limitations to QKD as it stands and how
they may be overcome, with special consideration to networks of QKD devices in Section 8. We offer a
concluding statement in Section 9.
2 A Brief Introduction to QKD
In this section we provide a very brief overview of quantum key distribution. More detailed explanations
are available from a variety of sources [NC00, ABB+07, SBPC+08].
In QKD, two parties, Alice and Bob, obtain some quantum states and measure them. They communi-
cate (all communication from this point onwards is classical) to determine which of their measurement
results could lead to secret key bits; some are discarded in a process called sifting because the measure-
ment settings were incompatible. They perform error correction and then estimate a security parameter
which describes how much information an eavesdropper might have about their key data. If this amount
is above a certain threshold, then they abort as they cannot guarantee any secrecy whatsoever. If it is
below the threshold, then they can apply privacy amplification to squeeze out any remaining information
the eavesdropper might have, and arrive at a shared secret key. Some of this classical communication
must be authenticated to avoid man-in-the-middle attacks. Some portions of the protocol can fail with
negligible probability.
A flow chart describing the stages of quantum key distribution is given in Figure 1.
Once a secret key has been established by QKD, it can be used for a variety of purposes. The most
common approach is to use it as the secret key in a one-time pad to achieve unconditionally secure
encryption. The key can also be used for classical authentication in subsequent rounds of QKD.
We can expect that as QKD research continues, QKD devices will become more robust, easier to
configure, less expensive, and smaller, perhaps sufficiently miniaturized to fit on a single circuit board.
3
3 Who Needs Quantum Key Distribution?
It is widely understood that “security is a chain; it’s as strong as the weakest link” [Sch03], and
cryptography, even public key cryptography, is indeed one of the strongest links in the chain. We cannot
trust that a particular computationally secure cryptographic scheme and parameter size will remain
secure indefinitely, and many expert recommendations are unwilling to provide guidance for much more
than 30 years in the future. While much of the information being encrypted today does not need 30
years of security, some does.
Moreover, it is important to plan well in advance for changes in security technology. Suppose, for
example, that a particular application using RSA or elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) needs information
to be secure for x years, and it takes y years to retool the infrastructure to a new cryptosystem. If
large-scale quantum computers capable of breaking RSA or ECC are built within z years, with z < x + y ,
then we are already too late: we need to start planning to use new cryptosystems long before old ones
are broken.
Government, military, and intelligence agencies need long-term security. For example, the UK
government did not declassify the 1945 report on its efforts in breaking the Tunny cipher during World
War II until 2000 [GMT45], and the US government’s current classification regime keeps documents
classified for up to 25 years [Bus03, §1.5(b)].
Businesses trying to protect long-term strategic trade secrets may also wish for long-term confiden-
tiality. Situations with long-term deployments but well-specified communication requirements could also
benefit from QKD: it is inconvenient and expensive to have to upgrade the 1.5 million automated teller
machines (ATMs) worldwide whenever the latest cryptographic protocol is broken or deemed obsolete,
but QKD could provide standards less likely to change due to cryptanalysis.
One particular industry likely to require long-term, future-proof security is health care. Health care
systems are slowly but irreversibly becoming more electronic, and health care records need privacy for
100 years or more. Securing the storage of these records in data centers is essential, of course, and
quantum key distribution does not aim to solve this difficult problem. Equally important, however, is
the secure communication of health care records, which can be protected by the information-theoretic
security offered by quantum key distribution.
Quantum key distribution is also not the only way to establish information theoretically secure
keys. The physical transfer of long, randomly generated keys is also an information theoretically secure
key distribution scheme. With hard drive prices approaching US $0.10 per gigabyte, one should not
underestimate “the bandwidth of a truck filled with hard drives” (although increases in fuel prices may
counteract the cost efficiency of such a communication system). This approach is not appropriate for
all scenarios. In some cases, it may be impossible to rekey a system in this manner (e.g., satellites
and space probes). It requires assurances that the physical keys were transported securely. It also
requires secure storage of large amounts of key until use. QKD requires only a small amount of key, the
authentication key, to be securely stored until use. Importantly, QKD can generate fresh encryption keys
on demand that need only be stored for the short time period between key generation and message
encryption/decryption, rather than needing large secure key storage since the distribution of the systems.
Moreover, research into experimental quantum information is still at such an early stage that one
cannot predict the final form of the products that could be developed from this technology, and these
systems may come to exceed the expectations and dreams of today’s researchers and engineers.
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4 The Security of QKD
Quantum key distribution is often described by its proponents as “unconditionally secure” to emphasize its
difference with computationally secure classical cryptographic protocols. While there are still conditions
that need to be satisfied for quantum key distribution to be secure, the phrase “unconditionally secure”
is justified because, not only are the conditions reduced, they are in some sense minimal necessary
conditions. Any secure key agreement protocol must make a few minimal assumptions, for security
cannot come from nothing: we must be able to identify and authenticate the communicating parties, we
must be able to have some private location to perform local operations, and all parties must operate
within the laws of physics.
The following statement describes the security of quantum key distribution, and there are many
formal mathematical arguments for the security of QKD (e.g., [May97, LC99, GLLP04]).
Theorem 1 (Security statement for quantum key distribution) If
A1) quantum mechanics is correct, and
A2) authentication is secure, and
A3) our devices are reasonably secure,
then with high probability the key established by quantum key distribution is a random secret key independent
(up to a negligible difference) of input values.
Assumption 1: Quantum mechanics is correct. This assumption requires that any eavesdropper be
bounded by the laws of quantum mechanics, although within this realm there are no further restrictions
beyond the eavesdropper’s inability to access the devices. In particular, we allow the eavesdropper to
have arbitrarily large quantum computing technology, far more powerful than the current state of the
art. Quantum mechanics has been tested experimentally for nearly a century, to very high precision.
But even if quantum mechanics is superseded by a new physical theory, it is not necessarily true that
quantum key distribution would be insecure: for example, secure key distribution can be achieved in
a manner similar to QKD solely based on the assumption that no faster-than-light communication is
possible [BHK05].
Assumption 2: Authentication is secure. This assumption is one of the main concerns of those
evaluating quantum key distribution. In order to be protected against man-in-the-middle attacks,
much of the classical communication in QKD must be authenticated. Authentication can be achieved
with unconditional security using short shared keys, or with computational security using public key
cryptography. We discuss the issue of authentication in greater detail in Section 6.
Assumption 3: Our devices are secure. Constructing a QKD implementation that is verifiably secure
is a substantial engineering challenge that researchers are still working on. Although the first prototype
QKD system leaked key information over a side channel (it made different noises depending on the
photon polarization, and thus the “prototype was unconditionally secure against any eavesdropper who
happened to be deaf” [Bra05]), experimental cryptanalysis leads to better theoretical and practical
security. More sophisticated side-channel attacks continue to be proposed against particular implementa-
tions of existing systems (e.g., [ZFQ+08]), but so too are better theoretical methods being proposed,
such as the decoy state method [Hwa03]. Device-independent security proofs [MY97, PAB+09] aim
to minimize the security assumptions on physical devices. It seems reasonable to expect that further
theoretical and engineering advances will eventually bring us devices which have strong arguments and
few assumptions for their security.
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5 Key Usage: Encryption
The most commonly discussed usage for the key generated by quantum key distribution is encryption.
There are two ways [PPS04] this key can be used for encryption.
In an unconditionally secure system, the private key from QKD is used as the key in a one-time pad.
Since the key is information theoretically secure, so too is the encryption of the message: no computer,
quantum or classical, will ever be able to decipher the encrypted message. There are challenges to this
system, however. First, the one-time pad keys must be carefully stored and managed, as the double-use
of one-time keys can seriously compromise security. Second, as we discuss in Section 7, physical QKD
systems cannot yet achieve sufficiently high key generation rates to be able to encrypt large messages
with one-time pads in real time.
To deal with this second challenge of low QKD key rates, hybrid systems have been proposed, where
the key from QKD is expanded with a classical stream cipher or block cipher such as the Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES) to encrypt long messages. In this setting, the security of the encrypted
messages is no longer information theoretic: it depends on the computational assumption that the cipher
used is hard to break. While this is not ideal, it may not be too risky either. Historically, cryptographers
have been very good at designing block ciphers with few weaknesses: for example, the Data Encryption
Standard (DES), designed in the 1970s, is no longer considered secure due to its short key length, but
DES has stood up well to over 30 years of cryptanalytic attacks. Under a known plaintext attack, the
security of DES is reduced from 256 to about 241, but, when rekeying is sufficiently frequent, the effect
of known plaintext attacks is limited [ABB+07, §3.2]. Moreover, quantum computers do not seem to
have too much impact on ciphers: while Grover’s search algorithm implies that the key length needs to
be doubled, the exponentially faster attacks promised by Shor’s algorithm and others do not apply to
most ciphers.
Even when used in hybrid systems, QKD offers a substantial advantage over classical key agreement:
the key from QKD is independent of any inputs to the key agreement protocol. Thus, QKD reduces the
number of points of attack: once a key has been established, the only way to attack such a system is to
cryptanalyze the encryption. By contrast, a system using classical key agreement could be attacked by
trying to take the inputs to the classical key agreement protocol and determining the generated private
key (e.g., by solving the Diffie-Hellman problem). However, when using QKD to generate short keys,
care must be taken due to finite length effects [CS09].
Hybrid QKD systems offer enhanced security compared to ciphers used without QKD: the QKD
subsystem provides fresh, independent keying material frequently, which can rekey the classical block or
stream cipher; with frequent rekeying, we reduce the risk of attacks against the underlying cipher that
make use of many plaintexts or ciphertexts encrypted under the same key.
6 Authentication
Quantum key distribution does not remove the need for authentication: indeed, authentication is
essential to the security of QKD, for otherwise it is easy to perform a man-in-the-middle attack. There are
two main ways to achieve authentication: public key authentication and symmetric key authentication.
Symmetric key authentication can provide unconditionally secure authentication, but at the cost of
needing to have pre-established pairs of symmetric keys. Public key authentication, on the other hand,
is simpler to deploy, and provides extraordinarily convenient distributed trust when combined with
certificate authorities (CAs) in a public key infrastructure (PKI). Public key authentication cannot itself
be achieved with information theoretic security. We argue, however, that the security situation is more
subtle than this: the use of public key authentication can still lead to systems that have very strong
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long-term security.
A third method for authentication is to use trusted third parties which actively mediate authentication
between two unauthenticated parties, but there has been little interest in adopting these in practice.
Certificate authorities, which are used in public key authentication, are similar to trusted third party
authentication but do not actively mediate the authentication: they distribute signed public keys in
advance but then do not participate in the actual key authentication protocol. The difference in trust
between trusted third parties and certificate authorities for authentication in QKD is smaller than in the
purely classical case since the key from QKD is independent of the inputs.
6.1 Symmetric Key Authentication
Parties who already share a short private key can use an unconditionally secure message authentication
code to authenticate their messages. The first such approach was described by Wegman and Carter
[WC81] and has been refined for use in QKD (for example, [PNM+05]). It is for this reason that
quantum key distribution is sometimes called quantum key expansion: it can take a short shared key and
expand it to an information-theoretically secure long shared key.
Interestingly, the universal composability of quantum key distribution implies that we can use some
of the key generated by QKD to authenticate the messages in the next round of QKD with a negligible
decrease in security. Thus we can continue QKD (more or less) indefinitely having started only with a
relatively short (on the order of a few kilobytes) authentication key.
6.2 Public Key Authentication
While symmetric key authentication promises unconditionally secure authentication, it is difficult to
deploy because each pair of communicating parties must share a private key. Public key infrastructures
allow for distributed trust and have been essential to the success of electronic commerce. While many
advocates of quantum cryptography dismiss the role of computationally secure public key authentication
in QKD, we argue that public key authentication will be vital in a quantum key distribution infrastructure
and can still provide meaningful security statements.
Public key authentication schemes, being computationally secure, tend to be broken, and invariably
sooner than we expect. In 1977, Rivest speculated [Gar77] that it could take 40 quadrillion years
to solve the RSA-129 problem (factoring a 129-decimal-digit RSA modulus), but it was broken only
17 years later [AGLL94]. While the popular press still occasionally uses expressions such as “more
than a quadrillion years” [Lys08] to describe the security of number-theoretic schemes, technical
recommendations [NIS07, BCC+08] are more nuanced and tend not to speculate too far beyond 2030.
Notably, these recommendations tend to “assume [...] (large) quantum computers do not become a
reality in the near future” [BCC+08, p. 25].
Large scale quantum computers are widely believed to be some time off, but there appears to be
no reason at present to doubt their eventual efficacy. Quantum computers, however, are not the only
threat against public key authentication. Computers do become faster and new algorithms do help
speed cryptanalysis. However, we are not so pessimistic to think that all public key authentication is
doomed forever. In fact, we believe that public key authentication will continue to play a vital role in
communication security indefinitely, even in the presence of quantum computing.
Although today’s popular public key schemes — RSA, finite field discrete logarithm, and elliptic
curve — would be broken by a large scale quantum computer, other “post-quantum” schemes do not
immediately fall to quantum algorithms, and other schemes are sure to be developed (cf. [BBD09]). It
seems to us, then, that public key schemes in the future are likely to go through a lifecycle in which a
new primitive is proposed, it appears secure against current attack techniques, reasonable parameter
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sizes are proposed, adopted, and then computing technology and cryptanalysis advances chip away
at the security until a newer scheme provides better tradeoffs. It is not too hard to imagine a 20-year
window in which a public key scheme, along with a particular set of parameter sizes, is considered
viable.
It is in this scenario, where a particular public key authentication scheme is only deemed to be
secure for a 20-year period, that quantum key distribution can thrive. A public key authentication
infrastructure provides the large scale usability that we have come to expect from PKIs, and when
combined with quantum key distribution can offer strong security promises. In quantum key distribution,
the authentication — in the form of public key authentication — only needs to be secure up to and
including the initial connection. Once the QKD protocol has output some secret key, a portion of
this secret can subsequently be used for symmetric key authentication. In fact, even if the original
authentication keys are revealed after the first QKD exchange, the key from QKD remains information
theoretically secure. In other words, we have the following statement:
If authentication is unbroken during the first round of QKD, even if it is only computationally
secure, then subsequent rounds of QKD will be information-theoretically secure.
By contrast, classical public key exchange schemes do not have this feature. Although one can
employ a protocol in which a new key is transmitted encrypted under the old key, an eavesdropper who
logs all communications and subsequently breaks the first key can read all future communications. With
QKD, new session keys are completely independent of all prior keys and messages.
7 Limitations
Two undeniable limitations of present quantum key distribution schemes are distance and key rate.
Because of the fragile nature of the quantum mechanical state that is transmitted during quantum key
distribution, the longer the distance that the photons have to travel, the more photons that are lost to
decoherence and noise and hence the lower the rate of secret key formation. Distance and key rate are a
tradeoff, but progress is being made on improving the overall tradeoff.
Distance. The longest QKD experiments to date have acheived secure key generation over a 184.6km
fiber optic link [HRP+06] and over a free-space link spanning a distance of 144km at a rate of 12.8
bits/second[SMWF+07] . This free-space distance is considered sufficient to communicate between any
two points on the surface of the Earth via orbiting satellites, the feasibility of which is the subject of a
proposed experiment [PAFdM+08].
Quantum repeaters [BDCZ98] would also overcome the distance limitation, allowing shared quantum
states to be established between distant parties. While these systems are not yet operational, they are
easier to implement than full-scale quantum computers; theoretical and experimental work progresses
on their development.
Key rate. While long distance experiments achieve very low key rates on the order of a few bits per
second, shorter distance experiments have demonstrated very high key rates. Experimental groups have
achieved key rates of over 4 MB per second over 1km of fibre [Nat06] and 1 Mb per second at 20km
[DYD+08]. These key rates are an impressive accomplishment are coming closer to the rates needed to
secure real communication channels.
When a QKD key is used for encryption, current key rates may not be sufficient for a one-time pad
and hybrid schemes need to be used, in which the QKD key is used as the private key in a symmetric
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encryption algorithm such as the block cipher AES. However, as we have argued in Section 5, even hybrid
QKD systems offer enhanced security compared to classical key agreement since the keys generated
by QKD are independent of any inputs to the key agreement procedure and since many symmetric
encryption algorithms are resistant to known attacks by quantum computers. Key rate can always be
negatively impacted by an adversary disturbing the quantum channel, but such an adversary can not
impact the security of the key agreement.
8 QKD Networks
As QKD technology progresses, the structure of deployed QKD systems will progress in four stages to
reduce distance limitations and increase commercial applicability:
1. Point-to-point links: Two QKD devices are directly connected over a relatively short distance.
2. Networks with optical switches: Multiple QKD devices are arranged in a network with optical
switches to allow different pairs of interaction. Optical switches, however, do not increase
communication distance. The switches need not be trusted. One example of such a network is the
DARPA quantum network [ECP+05].
3. Networks with trusted relays: Multiple QKD devices are arranged in a network. Intermediate nodes
in the network can act as classical relays which relay information between distant nodes. The relay
nodes need to be trusted, although trust can be reduced by having the sender use a secret sharing
scheme [BS08]. This type of QKD network would be suitable for scenarios where the operator
of the network is also the user of the network, for example, a bank creating a network among
its many branches, each of which is individually trusted. One example of such a network is the
SECOQC quantum network [ABB+07, SPD+09].
4. Fully quantum repeater network: Multiple QKD devices are arranged in a network with quantum
repeaters [BDCZ98]. Although individual links are still distance-limited, the quantum repeater
nodes allow entanglement to be linked across longer distances, so QKD can be performed between
distant parties. The quantum repeaters need not be trusted, and this type of QKD network
corresponds to the service provider scenario.
9 Conclusion
Quantum key distribution makes use of the eavesdropper-detection power offered by quantum mechanics
to establish a shared key that is verifiably secure and independent of any other data, provided the
communicating parties share an authentic channel. The security of the system depends on no computa-
tional assumptions and thus has the potential to offer security against present or future attackers with
unbounded classical or quantum computational power.
There are many scenarios, such as government, military, and health care, in which information
needs to remain secure for 25, 50, or even 100 years. Using QKD reduces the assumptions about the
cryptographic system and produces a shared secret key that, by the properties of quantum mechanics, is
independent of any other data, including the input.
It is important to consider how QKD fits into the larger cryptographic infrastructure. When used
with public key authentication, QKD provides strong security with the convenience of distributed
authentication using public key infrastructures; the public key authentication scheme need only be
secure up until QKD occurs, but the key from QKD will remain secure indefinitely. If public key
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authentication is not possible, shared secret authentication can still be used to give enhanced security
compared to classical key expansion.
The present limitations of QKD — distance and key rate — will be further mitigated as experimental
research in QKD continues, and quantum repeaters promise fully quantum long distance networks.
We believe that, as the technology continues to improve, QKD will be an increasingly valuable tool
in the cryptographer’s toolbox for building secure communication systems.
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